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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this
matter resulting in this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(3)(j). These
issues were addressed in the trial court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
ISSUE NUMBER 1. : Did the district court err in determining that
Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company ("Freddie Mac") is not liable
in equity to Plaintiff McKay Dee Credit Union ("McKay Dee") for unjust
enrichment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for review for this matter is that the appellate court should
give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the legal
conclusion reached by the trial court for correctness. The factual findings of the
trial court are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. See, Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970
P.2dl234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION
ARE DETERMINATIVE
None.
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE
None.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
McKay Dee was the holder of a deed of trust for certain real property (the
"Property") to secure a loan in the amount of $30,000.00. Said obligation was
junior to a deed of trust in the amount of $175,000.00 which was eventually
assigned to Freddie Mac. At all times the Property was worth more than the value
of the said debts. In April of 2001, McKay Dee received a notice of trustee's ale
from the first lienholder that the Property would be sold at trustee's sale on May
15, 2001. McKay Dee contacted a phone representative whish was identified in
the notice of trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale.
McKay Dee was advised that the sale had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to
be held at the same time and same location.
McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in
preparation to attend the trustee's sale and bid on the Property. McKay Dee
attended the postponed sale on May 18, 2001, and when nobody else attended
McKay Dee believed that the debtors had reinstated their mortgage with the first
lienholder as they had on several other occasions prior to this time. This was
further confirmed by the fact that the debtors continued to make their payments to
McKay Dee, continued living in the Property, and informed McKay Dee that they
had re-instated at that time. The debtors discontinued making monthly payments
to McKay Dee in June 2003 and McKay Dee subsequently found out that the
trustee's sale had apparently occurred May 17, 2001, one day earlier than the time
that the sales line had informed McKay Dee that the sale was going to take place.
6

McKay Dee brought an action against Freddie Mac for unjust enrichment.
R. 1-6. The trial court was unwilling to impose liability on Freddie Mac. R. 271.
Furthermore, the trial court found that McKay Dee had not conferred a benefit
upon Freddie Mac and therefore could not prevail on its unjust enrichment claim.
R. 271-72. McKay Dee believes that the Second District Court was in error.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 22, 1996, McKay Dee extended a home equity line of credit to

David R. and Julie S. Call (the "Calls") not to exceed $30,000.00. R. 203.
2.

McKay Dee received from the Calls a deed of trust in return for the above

loan. R. 203.
3.

Said obligation was junior to a deed of trust in favor of the Bank of Utah

issued in February of 1996 in the amount of $175,000.00. R. 203.
4.

McKay Dee accepted the deed of trust because they were informed that the

Property had sufficient equity to protect its interest. R. 203.
5.

At the time that McKay Dee extended its loan, the Property was worth

approximately.$287,000.00 according to the information and appraisals provided
to McKay Dee Credit Union. R. 203.
6.

At the same time that McKay Dee extended the loan it also recorded a

Request for Notice which entitled it to any notice of any action on senior
encumbrances. R. 203.
7.

The Bank of Utah loan was assigned to Wells Fargo Bank in April of 1998.

R. 204.
7

8.

Wells Fargo Bank later assigned said obligations to GMAC in July of 1998.

R.204.
9.

The Calls struggled in making their payments to the first lien holder and a

notice of default was recorded on June 17, 1999 but was later canceled on
September 7, 1999. Again, a new notice of default was recorded against the Calls
with regard to the first mortgage as of January 12, 2000, which was once again
canceled on April 26, 2000. R. 204.
10.

A third notice of default on the Property was recorded on August 8, 2000

by the Defendant or its representative. R. 204.
11.

A sale was scheduled for December of 2000 and McKay Dee intended to

bid at that sale to protect its position. However, the Calls apparently made
reinstatement arrangements prior to that sale being accomplished. R. 204.
12.

In April of 2001, McKay Dee received again a notice of trustee's sale from

the first lienholder that the Property would be sold at trustee's sale on May 15,
2001. R.204.
13.

McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in

preparation to attend that trustee's sale and bid on the Property. R. 205.
14.

When McKay Dee called the sales line, provided for in the notice of

trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale McKay Dee was
advised that the sale had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to be held at the same
time and same location. R. 205.
15.

On or about May 17, 2001, GMAC assigned the first deed to Freddie Mac.
8

16.

McKay Dee attended the postponed sale on May 18, 2001, and when

nobody else attended McKay Dee believed that the debtors had once again
reinstated their mortgage with the first lienholder as they had each prior time.
This was further confirmed by the fact that the Calls continued to make their
payments to McKay Dee, continued living in the Property, and informed McKay
Dee that they had re-instated at that time. R. 205.
17.

The Calls discontinued making monthly payments to McKay Dee in June

2003 and McKay Dee subsequently found out that the trustee's sale had apparently
occurred May 17, 2001, one day earlier than the time that the sales line had
informed McKay Dee that the sale was going to take place. R. 205.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In reaching its conclusion that it was unwilling to impose liability on
Freddie Mac the trial court made the following finding of fact, "[i]t is not clear to
this Court if Mr. Shirra (Vice-President of McKay Dee) wrote the wrong sale date
down, or if GMAC provided the wrong date." R. 271. However, upon a closer
examination of Mr. Shirra's recorded testimony and the other evidence before the
trial court this finding of fact by the trial court is erroneous. Therefore, the trial
court should have imposed liability upon Defendants.
Furthermore, in reasonably relying upon the information provided to them
about the postponement of the trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to defend its
trust deed position and Freddie Mac was able to purchase the Property as the only
bidder for the amount of $183,344.61. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 7. By its
9

own admission Freddie Mac was able to then sell the Property for the approximate
amount of $269,900.00. R. 128. Therefore, the benefit conferred upon Freddie
Mac was at least the profit of $86,555.39 that they received in selling the Property.
Freddie Mac had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit received from
McKay Dee and Freddie Mac's retention of the benefit under the circumstances
surrounding the apparent trustee's sale would be inequitable without payment to
McKay Dee for the amount due to it. Therefore, the trial court erred in not
granting McKay Dee's unjust enrichment claim.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE IT WAS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS TO CONCLUDE THAT MCKAY DEE HAD NOT
BEEN GIVEN THE WRONG DATE OF THE TRUSTEE'S SALE.
Utah law is clear that a trustee's foreclosure sale is void when a defect or

irregularity, "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an
inadequacy of the price". Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services, Inc., 743
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). Concepts and its progeny, i.e. Timm v. Dewsnup,
86 P.3d 699 (Utah 2003), and Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr,
791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990), arise from circumstances where trustee's sales
were conducted with a valid notice of default, but an alleged irregularity in either:
1) a defect in the notice of sale itself (Concepts), 2) the timing of the notice of sale
(Occidental), or the service of the notice of sale (Timm). Therefore, in this case
the trial court should have imposed liability upon Freddie Mac if it concluded that

10

McKay Dee had received the wrong date for the trustee's sale because such an
irregularity "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an
inadequacy of the price." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159.
In reaching its conclusion that it was unwilling to impose liability on
Freddie Mac the trial court made the following finding of fact, "[i]t is not clear to
this Court if Mr. Shirra (Vice-President of McKay Dee) wrote the wrong sale date
down, or if GMAC provided the wrong date." R. 271. A close examination of
Mr. Shirra's recorded testimony and the other evidence before the trial court
demonstrates that this finding of fact was clearly erroneous.
Mr. Shirra testified that he called the sales line provided for in the notice of
trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale. R. 303, Bench Trial
Transcript p. 41. "I was given the date that the sale was rescheduled for 5/18, May
the 18 , which is three days later." R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 41. This
testimony is consistent with the testimony Mr. Shirra gave in his affidavit. R. 141.
It is also consistent with the testimony he gave during his deposition. R. 244.
Furthermore, Mr. Shirra's testimony is supported by the Notice of Sale. R. 192.
Mr. Shirra testified that while listening to the message on the sales line he circled
the date 5/15/2001 and then drew a line out to the side where he wrote the new
date 5/18/2001. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 41. Also, Mr. Shirra's
testimony is strengthened by the fact that he had a check prepared, R. 198, and
attended the postponed sale on May 18, 2001. R. 205.
Freddie Mac has never presented any evidence to contradict Mr. Shirra's
11

testimony. In fact it should be noted that Freddie Mac's only defense to this
pivotal fact is the disclaimer notice given at the beginning of the sales line
recording, a defense that the trial court concluded to be wholly insupportable. R.
303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 114. Thus, in reaching its finding that it was not
convinced that McKay Dee had been given the wrong date for the trustee's sale
the only evidence that the trial court relied on was the evidence presented above
along with Mr. Shirra's cross examination testimony. R. 271.
During cross examination Mr. Shirra was asked about the Notice of Sale
with the handwriting indicating the sale date of May 18th, 2001. R. 303, Bench
Trial Transcript p. 54. He again testified that this was his handwriting. R. 303,
Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. He was then asked, "[i]s it possible that you could
have written down the incorrect date for the sale?" R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript
p. 54. He responded by again saying, "I wrote that down and so I got it from the
sale line." R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. It was only after being pressed
on the issue by Freddie Mac's counsel several times that Mr. Shirra indicated,
"[t]here is that possibility." "The same as the possibility of them having the
wrong date." R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. The fact that Mr. Shirra stated
a possibility does not go to the weight or to the credibility of his testimony.
Taking this testimony together with all of Mr. Shirra's other testimony and
all the evidence before the trial court it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to
conclude that McKay Dee was not given the wrong date for the trustee's sale.
Therefore, the trial court should have imposed liability upon Freddie Mac because
12

McKay Dee had been given the wrong date for the trustee's sale and that is the
type of irregularity that, "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing
an inadequacy of the price.'5 Id.
II.

MCKAY DEE'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE MCKAY DEE CONFERRED
A KNOWN BENEFIT UPON THE DEFENDANTS WHICH IF THEY
RETAIN WHOULD BE WHOLLY INEQUITABLE.
The facts underlying an unjust enrichment claim are often complex and

vary greatly from case to case. Allen v. Hall 565 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 2006),
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto. Inc., 12 P.3d 580 (Utah 2000), Jeffs v. Stubbs,
970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). Indeed, by its very nature, the unjust enrichment
doctrine developed to handle fact situations, like the one present in this case, that
do not fit within a particular legal standard but which nonetheless merit judicial
intervention. Id., see also Restatement of Restitution, intro. n. (1937) (noting that
narrow early common law causes of actions posed difficulties and required
creation of chancery courts because "there were many situations in which one
justly entitled to recover was not able to do so"). While the unjust enrichment
doctrine has ancient roots, and courts have had a great deal of opportunity to apply
it, the court's ability to state clearly the outcome-determinative factors remains
elusive. Id However, the rationale for granting equitable relief is that as a matter
of reason and justice from the acts and conduct of the parties and circumstances
surrounding a transaction, restitution need be provided for the purpose of bringing
about justice. IdL

13

For example in the Jeffs case the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial
courts ruling that individuals who built improvements on land located in Hildale,
Utah which they did not even own because the property was held in trust by the
United Effort Plan Trust ("the UEP") were able to recover for unjust enrichment.
Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1248. The trial court held that even though the individuals
intended to benefit and would benefit from the improvements by occupying the
property during their lifetimes, the individuals' services still conferred a direct, not
incidental, benefit on the UEP and thus they were able to recover for them. Id.
The Jeffs case is instructive that the cause of action of unjust enrichment is
equitable in nature and should be broadly construed. The trial court rigidly
applied the elements of unjust enrichment without looking at the broad picture.
McKay Dee's nonattendance at the trustee's sale was unfairly induced by
Defendants with inaccurate information. The non-attendance at the sale benefited
Freddie Mac abundantly. Had McKay Dee been provided with accurate
information, it would have attended the sale, and McKay Dee would have at least
received the amount owed on the underlying note, if not more because the
property was worth so much more. Instead, Freddie Mac received a huge unjust
enrichment from McKay Dee Credit Union.
In Utah a party may prevail on an unjust enrichment theory by proving
three elements: "(I) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance
or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
14

inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value."
American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical 930 P.2d 1182, 119293 (1996). Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money
or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another. Id,
The trial court found that McKay Dee had not conferred a benefit upon
Freddie Mac and therefore could not prevail on its unjust enrichment claim. R.
271-72. However, when looking at all the facts presented to the trial court its
conclusion is not correct.

A. MCKAY DEE CONFERRED A BENEFIT UPON FREDDIE
MAC.
In this case McKay Dee conferred a benefit upon Freddie Mac by not
attending the trustee's sale which apparently occurred May 17, 2001. R. 205. In
April of 2001, McKay Dee received a notice of trustee's sale from the first
lienholder that the Property would be sold at trustee's sale on May 15? 2001. R.
204. McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in
preparation to attend the trustee's sale and bid on the Property. R. 204. When
McKay Dee called the sales line, provided for in the notice of trustee's sale, to
ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale McKay Dee was advised that the sale
had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to be held at the same time and same
location. R. 205. Again, McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by
issuing a check and attending the postponed sale on May 18, 2001. R. 205.
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In reasonably relying upon the information provided to them about the
postponement of the trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to defend its position
and Freddie Mac was able to purchase the Property as the only bidder for the
amount of $183,344.61. R. 303 Bench Trial Transcript p. 7. By its own
admission Freddie Mac was able to then sell the Property for the approximate
amount of $269,900.00. R. 128. Therefore, the benefit conferred upon Freddie
Mac was the profit of $86,555.39 that Freddie Mac received in selling the
Property.

B. FREDDIE MAC HAD APPRECIATION OR KNOWLEDGE OF
THE BENEFIT RECEIVED FROM MCKAY DEE.
At the same time that McKay Dee extended the loan to the Calls it also
recorded a Request for Notice which entitled it to any notice of any action on
senior encumbrances. R. 203. McKay Dee received the previous notice of
defaults recorded on June 17, 1999, January 12, 2000, and August 8, 2000 as well
as the notice of trustee's sale in April of 2001. R. 204. By its own admissions
Freddie Mac knew that the Property would most likely be sold to a third party
because there was significant equity in it. R. 241. Therefore, Freddie Mac had an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit received from McKay Dee's not
attending the apparent trustee's sale. Morever, McKay Dee's failure to attend the
sale was induced by Freddie Mac.

16

C. THE RETENTION BY FREDDIE MAC OF THE BENEFIT
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
APPARENT TRUSTEE'S SALE WOULD BE INEQUITABLE
WITHOUT PAYMENT TO MCKAY DEE.
McKay Dee extended the loan in good faith, attempted to defend its second
lien position in good faith, received payments from the customers for two years
beyond the date that the property was sold and has now been left with a deficiency
plus after accruing interest and has accrued attorney's fees and costs incurred in
bringing its action. On the other hand Freddie Mac was able to purchase the
Property as the only bidder for the amount of $183,344.61 and then by their own
admission were able to sell it for the approximate amount of $269,900.00 leaving
them with a profit of $86,555.39. To permit Freddie Mac to retain the benefit and
value received from McKay Dee in regard to the windfall from the sale of the
Property without compensating McKay Dee would result in an unjust enrichment
of Freddie Mac, at the expense of McKay Dee, which unjust enrichment should

4

not be allowed.
CONCLUSION
In summary, while the circumstances of this case are somewhat unique the
remedy of unjust enrichment is not confined to any particular circumstance or set
of facts. It is, rather, a flexible, equitable remedy to be applied when the court
finds that "the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties
of natural justice and equity" to make compensation for benefits received.
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Freddie Mac is not liable in equity to
17

Plaintiff McKay Dee for unjust enrichment because McKay Dee conferred a
known benefit upon Freddie Mac which if they are allowed to retain would be
wholly inequitable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTEDAis _S_ day o^November, 2007

M. Darin Hammond
Attorneys for Appellant.
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fcJi,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL D ^ ^ € T l C G t J & T
, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

MCKAY DEE CREDIT UNION,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 040901626

vs.
GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION and
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORP., et al,

Ernie W. Jones
District Judge
F

£B 1 3 2001

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on January 18, 2007 before the Honorable Ernie Jones. The
Plaintiff was represented by Attorney Darin Hammond. The Defendant was represented by
Attorney Brad DeHaan.
The Court, having heard the testimony and arguments of counsel, and having reviewed
the exhibits, rules as follows:

I. The Wrong Date for Foreclosure:
1. The mortage foreclosure was originally set for May 15, 2001. McKay Dee Credit
Union personnel believed the sale was moved to May 18, 2001. Mr. Shirra, Vice President of
McKay Dee Credit Union, called the sale telephone line and wrote down May 18, 2001 on the
notice. (See exhibit PI2).

Page 1 o f 4

Memorandum decision (from trial

VD19461865

o*

2. Mr. Shirra testified that he thought the date of the sale was May 18, 2001, but admitted
on cross-examination that it was possible he wrote the wrong date down.
3. The foreclosure sale was actually held on May 17, 2001.
4. The Plaintiff has the burden of proof in this case.
5. Based on the testimony, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff has met the burden of
proof. The issue is whether G.M.A.C. gave the Plaintiff the wrong date, or whether Mr. Shirra
wrote down the wrong sale date.
6. It is not clear to the Court if Mr. Shirra wrote the wrong date for the sale down, or if
G.M.A.C. provided the wrong date.
7. Since the Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof, the Court is unwilling to
impose liability on the Defendant for the error.
II. Unjust Enrichment Claim:
8. Plaintiff seeks relief on grounds of unjust enrichment to Plaintiffs detriment.
9. Three elements must be present for unjust enrichment:
a) there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another;
b) the second and third elements are not relevant to this issue.
10. In this case, Plaintiff claims Defendant received a windfall in excess of $25,000 and
that Plaintiff conferred this benefit on Defendants.
11. The Court finds the Plaintiff conferred no benefit on Defendant. Plaintiff did not pay
money or provide any benefit directly to Defendant.
12. Any benefit received by Defendant was conferred by Defendant's own effort in
completing the foreclosure sale.
Page 2 of 4

exists to support its claim for unjust enrichment.
14. Plaintiff cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment against the Defendant.
HI Damages:
15. Plaintiff claims it is entitled to the excess sale proceeds from the sale of the property.
16. The Court finds it is speculation on the part of the Plaintiff that Plaintiff would have
received any excess proceeds.
17. There is no way to determine if Plaintiff would have prevailed at the sale in any event.
18. While it is unfortunate that the Credit Union lost the opportunity to bid on the
property, there is no way to determine if they would have been the successful bidder.
19. It is speculation to say the Credit Union would have prevailed at the sale.
20. There is no doubt the Credit Union was prepared to bid, but this only amounts to a
lost opportunity. There is no unjust enrichment, only a lost opportunity to bid on the property.
21. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to prove its case. The Court enters
judgment in favor of the Defendant, for no cause of action.
22. Defendant will prepare an order consistent with this decision for signature and entry.

Dated this

?

of

ERNfe JONES
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE'
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f^4^'2007.
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Certificate of Mailing:
I hereby certifyr that on the Jj.
//L of Ja^aary^007, I mailed a copy of the foregoing order
to counsel, as follows:

M. Darin Hammond
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403

Brad DeHaan
Scott Lundberg
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Plaintiff pro se
384 South 7400 East
HuntsviUe,UT 84317

/^enna Woodring
sad Deputy Cou$ Clerk

Page 4 of 4

273

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, ST^TE^E, WTAH3- 3U

MCKAY DEE CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 040901626 MI

AUG 1 -r> 2007

Appellate Case No. 20070399-SC

FEDERAL HOME LOAN
MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
et al.,
Defendant.

With Keyword Index
BENCH TRIAL HELD JANUARY 18, 2007
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES

VD19772637

pages: 1

040901626 FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTG/

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

FY

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

M. DARIN HAMMOND
Smith Knowles

For the Defendant:

BRAD G. DAHAAN
Attorney at Law
* * *

INDEX
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mr. DeHaan
Mr. Hammond
Ruling

Page
2, 23
17
26

WITNESS
CAMERON CLIFFORD SHIRRA
Direct Examination by Mr. Hammond
Cross Examination by Mr. DeHaan
Redirect Examination by Mr. Hammond

29
46
61

DAVID ROBERT CALL
Direct Examination by Mr. Hammond
Cross Examination by Mr. DeHaan

63
72

JOHN S. PALMER
Direct Examination by Mr. Hammond
Cross Examination by Mr. DeHaan

75
84

CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Mr. Hammond
Mr. DeHaan

101,110
106

I

date or was he given the wrong date and that's, again, I'm

fy

trying to figure out how I, you know, because I mean I felt

3

like he was extremely honest in his testimony.

4

that is a big, big issue in this case is was he given the

5

wrong date or did he just write down the wrong date and so

6

your assessment of his testimony is what?

7

the wrong date?

8
9

But to me

That he was given

MR. HAMMOND: That he was given the wrong date.
That, that's what he said that the phone line provided to him

10

that date and the second element, the second prong of his

11

testimony that he [inaudible] wrote that down and that was

12

what his best recollection was and I agree that he was trying

13

to forthright with the Court.

14

MR. DEHAAN: Can I address that, Your Honor?

15

THE COURT: Yes.

16

MR. DEHAAN: I've got some issues a little bit with

17

Mr. Shirra's testimony.

18

says I attended the trustee sale.

19

there are numerous instances where he asserts that he has no

20

recollection of attending the sale.

21

an issue of reliability.

22

He initially gets on the stand and
But in his deposition

So I believe that raises

And secondly, he testified that he could have

23

written down the incorrect date; that it's possible that he

24

wrote down the incorrect date.

25

by, by the defendants or by the trustee.

That date was not provided
That's a date that
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1

he wrote down on a trustee's deed.

2

date by the sale line, the sale line has a major disclaimer

3

that says this information -

Even if he was given that

1

THE COURT: Yeah, I know that.

5

MR. DEHAAN:

6

THE COURT: That, that whole concept just hits me

- is inaccurate.

7

wrong.

That, that you can call the number and they can give

8

you information and oh, by the way, we may give you the wrong

9

information.

So don't rely upon this.

I mean that, that's,

10

to me that's crap.

To be able to make some kind of

11

disclaimer when you're calling to find out, you know, when's

12

this sale going to take place.

13

somebody on the other end told him it was the 18th, then I

14

think they're going to be responsible for that.

15

struggling with, and I know that you make this disclaimer and

16

I think that why bother even having a, having a recording or

17

having anybody on the other end.

18

here's the date.

19

may not mean anything and you can't hold us to it.

20

the whole concept of the disclaimer is troubling to me.

21

putting that aside, what I'm trying to figure out is did

22

somebody on the other end tell him the 18th.

23

critical to this case and I just can't figure out whether he

24

wrote the wrong date down or whether somebody gave him the

25

18th.

I mean to me if he called and

But what I'm

It's like saying, well,

But by the way, it may not be reliable.

It

I mean
But

I think that's
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1

MR, DEHAAN: I understand your concern.

I

2

understand the troubling aspect of the disclaimer.

3

that's an issue of whether disclaimers should be provided or

4

not in a general sense.

5

Shirra's testimony is unreliable.

6

could have written down the wrong date; that the date was

7

provided, or he came up with that date.

8

provided by the defendants or by the trustee that [inaudible]

9

itself.

10

I suppose

In this case I do assert that Mr.
He did testify that he

It wasn't a date

THE COURT: But where else would he have come up

11

with the date.

It makes more sense that somebody gave him

12

the date than it does that he made a mistake.

13

sure that's what happened here.

14

out.

15

the notice.

16

date the 15th and then writes 5/18/01 out to the side.

17

that's pretty credible.

16

I wrote down the wrong date.

19

concern and so I, that's what I'm trying to figure out.

20

he given the 18th, or did he make a mistake and write down

21

the 18th?

But I'm not

I'm just trying to figure

I mean, you know, to me, he's sitting there.

He's got

He makes the phone call, and then he circles the
To me

But when he said it's possible that
That, that caused me some

22

MR. DEHAAN:

23

things all the time, Your Honor.

Was

I write down incorrect dates and

24

THE COURT: I know, so do I.

25

MR. DEHAAN:

But even with that, I still would
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1

assert that the code provides that everything was complied

2

with, that the trustee's -

3

THE COURT: Well, I know what all the documents say.

4

MR. DEHAAN: Okay.

5

THE COURT: And I know there was a mistake made here

6

by somebody, you know, and that's what I'm trying to figure

7

out.

8

wrong date.

9

case is this property was up for sale and it was cancelled

10

and we went through the same process over and over and over

11

again and so I can see where they're coming from thinking,

12

oh, it's been cancelled again.

13

difference to know where that, the 18th came from.

14

mistake, or is the, was it the -

15
16

If McKay Dee just made a mistake and wrote down the
But you know what's so frustrating about this

But I think it makes a big

MR. HAMMOND: [inaudible] or not.

Is it his

Would the Court

like to ask any more questions of Mr. Shirra?

17

THE COURT: You know what to me it's critical enough

18

I, yeah, I wouldn't mind hearing from him again on this

19

because I, to me the case really to a large extent hinges on

20

that date.

21

me.

I, in my opinion, it's the number one issue for

22

Do you have any objection if we put him back on.

23

MR. DEHAAN: I would object to that, Your Honor.

24
25

I

think plaintiff rested it's case.
THE COURT: Okay.

All right, well I'm not going to
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1

put him back on.

2

can read it back, or have it read back.

3

the tape.

4

under advisement.

5

critical part of the case, I think.

6

I know what his testimony is and I can, I
I can get a copy of

But anyway, what I'm going to do is take this
Because I really think that's the, such a

The other question I had for Mr. Hammond is a

7

question of damages.

Let's assume that I rule in favor of

8

McKay Dee and I'm trying to figure out how you assess

9

damages.

Because what it boils down to is, hey, and you know

10

Mr. Palmer was right.

11

to bid on the property and they weren't given that

12

opportunity, for whatever reason.

13

assess the damages because aren't we speculating to a certain

14

extent?

15

Dee been there at the same time that Freddie Mac was there,

16

we don't know who would have won the bid, do we?

17

I, how do I calculate damages in a situation like that?

18

He said we just wanted an opportunity

But I don't know how you

In other words, had they both been there, had McKay

So how do

MR. HAMMOND: Well, the best way that I think that

19

the Court has to calculate that is to look at what McKay Dee

20

lost, and McKay Dee first [inaudible] lost the entire benefit

21

of that sale.

22

THE COURT: Well, I don't have any trouble with the

23

loan, the 30,000 or 25,000 that they, they put out, but what

24

I'm getting to is the profit.

25

profit made from the sale on this property.

We know that there was a
The 269 less the
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